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This paper examines how the introduction of deposit insurance influences the relationship between bank cap-
ital and liquidity creation. As discussed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), there are two competing hypothes-
es on this relationship which can be influenced by the presence of deposit insurance. The introduction of a 
deposit insurance scheme in an emerging market, Russia, provides a natural experiment to investigate this 
issue. We study three alternative measures of bank liquidity creation and perform estimations on a large set 
of Russian banks. Our findings suggest that the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme exerts a limited 
impact on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation and does not change the negative sign 
of the relationship. The implication is that better capitalized banks tend to create less liquidity, which sup-
ports the “financial fragility/crowding-out” hypothesis. This conclusion has important policy implications for 
emerging countries as it suggests that bank capital requirements implemented to support financial stability 
may harm liquidity creation.  
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Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, kuinka talletusvakuutuksen käyttöönotto vaikuttaa pankin pää-
oman ja likviditeetin luomisen väliseen suhteeseen. Kuten Berger ja Bouwman (2009) ovat mainin-
neet, muuttujien suhteesta on kaksi kilpailevaa hypoteesia, joihin talletusvakuutuksen olemassaolo 
saattaa vaikuttaa. Talletusvakuutuksen käyttöönotto Venäjän kehittyvässä taloudessa tarjoaa luon-
nollisen koetilanteen tutkittaessa tätä kysymystä. Pankin likviditeetin luomista tarkastellaan tutki-
muksessa kolmella eri mittarilla ja estimoinnit tehdään venäläisistä pankeista koostuvan suuren ai-
neiston avulla. Tutkimustulosten mukaan talletusvakuutuksen käyttöönotolla on rajallinen vaikutus 
pankin pääoman ja likviditeetin luomisen väliseen suhteeseen, eikä talletusvakuutus muuta näiden 
negatiivista suhdetta. Pankit, joilla on enemmän pääomaa, luovat tulosten mukaan vähemmän likvi-
diteettiä.  Tämä  tukee  taloudellisen  epävakauden/syrjäyttämisen  (financial  fragility/crowding-out) 
hypoteesia. Johtopäätöksellä on merkittävää politiikka-arvoa kehittyvien talouksien kannalta, koska 
tulosten mukaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakautta tukevat pääomavaatimukset saattavat haitata likvi-
diteetin luomista.  
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1  Introduction  
 
The recent financial crisis provides a stark reminder of the substantial role banks play in liquidity 
creation. Yet, while the literature deals extensively with banks as risk transformers, their function in 
liquidity creation has largely been neglected.
2 A recent paper by Berger and Bouwman (2009) a t-
tempts to correct this situation by offering a new method for measuring liquidity created by banks 
and investigating the role of bank capital in liqu idity creation for US banks. This issue is of great 
interest, particularly with respect to policy in setting of bank capital requirements. The role of capi-
tal in minimizing the impact of losses has received considerable attention. However, how bank capi-
tal impacts liquidity creation should also be taken into account when assessing the role of capital on 
financial stability. 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) observe that two hypotheses largely frame the current discus-
sion of the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. The “risk absorption” hypothe-
sis predicts that higher capital enhances the ability of banks to create liquidity. This hypothesis 
comes out of two strands of literature dealing with the role of banks as risk transformers. Liquidity 
creation increases the bank’s exposure to risk as its losses increase with the level of illiquid assets to 
satisfy the liquidity demands of customers (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2004), while bank capital allows 
the bank to absorb greater risk (e.g. Repullo, 2004). 
In contrast, the “financial fragility/crowding-out” hypothesis predicts that greater capital 
hampers liquidity creation. This hypothesis brings together two distinct effects: a higher capital ra-
tio crowds out deposits, thereby reducing liquidity creation, while financial fragility, characterized 
by lower capital, tends to favor liquidity creation (Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001). 
Roughly described, the financial fragility effect is the outcome of a following process. The 
bank collects funds from depositors and lends them to borrowers. Once the loan is issued, the 
bank’s job is to monitor the borrower and collect loan payments. This helps the bank obtain private 
information on its borrowers that gives it an advantage in assessing the profitability of its borrow-
ers. This informational advantage, however, creates an agency problem, whereby the bank may be 
tempted to extort rents from its depositors by demanding a greater share of the loan income. If de-
positors refuse to pay the higher costs, the bank threatens to curtail its monitoring or loan collecting 
                                                 
2 According to standard liquidity creation theory, a bank creates liquidity by transforming illiquid assets into liquid lia-
bilities. Diamond and Rajan (2000) however point out that liquidity is also created by simply changing banks’ funding 
mix on their liability side. Berger and Bouwman (2009) consider changes in the mixes on both sides of banks’ balance 
sheets and also off-balance sheet activities. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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efforts. As depositors know that the bank may abuse their trust, they become leery about depositing 
their money with the bank. The bank is thus forced to demonstrate its commitment to depositors by 
adopting a fragile financial structure with a large share of liquid deposits. The consequence of this 
fragile financial structure is that the bank runs the risk of losing funding if it attempts to withhold 
depositors. As such, the threat of bank runs mitigates the holdup problem which arises after deposi-
tors have put their funds to the bank.  Consequently, by allowing the bank to receive more deposits 
and finance more loans, financial fragility favors liquidity creation. As greater capital reduces fi-
nancial fragility, it enhances the bargaining power of the bank and hampers the credibility of its 
commitment to the depositors. Thus, greater capital works to diminish liquidity creation. 
A key issue here is how a deposit insurance scheme might influence this relationship. With 
deposit insurance, depositors have no incentive to withdraw their money, so deposit contracts do 
nothing to mitigate the holdup problem. As a result, greater capital does not reduce liquidity crea-
tion. 
Our aim is to probe the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation by analyz-
ing how introduction of a deposit insurance scheme influences this linkage. We examine the case of 
Russia as it provides a unique natural experiment to investigate this issue. Russia implemented its 
deposit insurance scheme in 2004. 
This study contributes to research investigating how bank capital influences financial sta-
bility and also sheds light on some of the neglected effects of deposit insurance schemes. The det-
rimental  incentives  for  moral  hazard  behavior  for  banks  promoted  through  deposit  insurance 
schemes are well understood (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002), but we only vaguely 
grasp how implementation of a deposit insurance scheme might contribute to the reduction of the 
negative link between bank capital and liquidity creation in ways that promote the benefits of bank 
capital for the economy. Of course, bank regulators frequently look to see how well banks are meet-
ing their capital requirements as it is received dictum that bank capital contributes to financial sta-
bility. What they may ignore is the fact that capital requirements might also be detrimental for li-
quidity creation as the negative effects of bank capital on liquidity creation  can overwhelm the 
benefits in some instances. The introduction of deposit insurance scheme may reduce the negative 
effects, solving the dilemma for policymakers in favor either of financial stability through higher 
bank capital or of liquidity creation with lower bank capital. 
This analysis also contributes to the literature on liquidity creation by banks. We provide 
the first investigation of the role bank capital plays in liquidity creation in emerging markets, which 
contributes to a better understanding of financial stability in emerging countries and the implica- 
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tions of bank capital requirements there. We also consider whether the relationship between bank 
capital  and  liquidity  creation  differs  depending  on  the  form  of  bank  ownership.  Berger  and 
Bouwman (2009) show that this relationship may vary depending on the size of the bank as the un-
derlying arguments may play different roles depending on the type of bank. In the same vein, we 
ask whether private or foreign ownership influences this relationship. As major debates about the 
banking industry in emerging economies focus on the benefits of privatization and the presence of 
foreign investors, we examine how ownership interacts with bank capital and liquidity creation in 
Russia. Russia’s banking sector is characterized by the coexistence of three types of banks (state-
controlled banks, domestic private banks, and foreign-owned banks), which provides a broad spec-
trum of ownership arrangements to investigate. 
We use a rich panel dataset on banks in Russia covering the periods before and after the in-
troduction of the deposit insurance scheme. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we measure 
liquidity created by Russian banks by classifying all bank assets and liabilities as liquid, semi-liquid 
or illiquid. We then assign weights to these categories and compute the amount of liquidity created 
by each bank. 
Our empirical strategy is based on two complementary methodologies. First, we adopt the 
difference-in-difference approach to analyze the impact of the deposit insurance scheme on the rela-
tionship between bank capital and liquidity creation. This approach controls for the changing eco-
nomic conditions. We apply it by using a unique feature of deposit insurance in Russia: the implicit 
deposit insurance of state-controlled banks during the entire observation period. We thus assume 
that state-controlled banks were unaffected by the deposit insurance scheme and compare changes 
in liquidity creation around the time of deposit insurance introduction for banks affected by the 
scheme against changes for state-controlled banks, which had essentially enjoyed implied deposit 
insurance earlier. Second, we test whether the nature of the relationship between bank capital and 
liquidity creation changes with the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme. Regressing li-
quidity creation measures on bank capital before and after its implementation allows us to check 
whether the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme contributed to change in the sign of this 
relationship. We report the sign of this relationship for all banks in Russia, accounting in terms of 
both bank ownership and size. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present data and li-
quidity creation measures. Section 3 describes the difference-in-difference approach and section 4 Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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presents  the  separate  regressions  before  and  after  the  implementation  of  the  deposit  insurance 
scheme. We conclude in section 5. 
 
 
2  Data and measures 
 
2.1  Data 
 
Our main dataset consists of the quarterly balance sheet and income statement information of Rus-
sian banks provided by the financial information agency Interfax, which collects and organizes this 
data from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR).
3  The original data feature an unbalanced panel con-
taining over 41,000 bank-quarter observations for 1,593 credit institutions from the first quarter of 
1999 to the first quarter of 2007. To make sure our tests are based on deposit-taking banking institu-
tions only, we drop observations that fulfill at least one of the fol lowing criteria. First, we exclude 
observations where the average total-loans-to-total-assets ratio is less than or equal to 5%. Second, 
we drop those observations where the sum of deposits equals zero. Third, the capital-to-assets ratio 
should not be larger than 100%. To avoid the potential distortion of the results by deeply financial 
troubled banks or banks that have had their licenses pulled by Russian regulators, we further drop 
the observations that show a capital-to-assets ratio less than or equal to 2%.
4  Finally, since banks 
that were not admitted to the deposit insurance scheme are prohibited from collecting household 
deposits, we only consider banks participating in the scheme in our analysis. 
In our estimations, we use information on bank branches by regions collected from the 
CBR website. Regional data come from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). Table 
1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used. 
Foreign-owned banks are defined based on the CBR data as those with foreign ownership 
shares in excess of 50%. State-controlled banks are identified using the classification by Vernikov 
(2009). These include banks owned by the government or central bank, as well as banks owned by 
state-controlled companies. In addition to ownership type, we also classify banks by size. Large, or 
systemic, banks are those ranked 1−50 in terms of total assets. Following the CBR, banks ranked 
51−200 in terms of total assets are classed as medium-sized banks. The remaining small banks on 
average accounted for about 10% of banking sector assets during our observation period. 
 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed description of the dataset, see Karas and Schoors (2005). 
4 Russian regulations require withdrawal of a bank’s license if its capital ratio falls below 2%.  
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2.2   Measures of bank liquidity creation 
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) provide a detailed description of measuring bank liquidity creation 
based on the US bank financial statement data. Following their methodology, we construct the li-
quidity creation measures for Russian banks with the necessary customization based on Russian fi-
nancial data. 
We start by classifying balance sheet items as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. This applies 
to all itemized terms for assets, liabilities, and equity.
5  We then assign weights to all the items, and 
calculate the measures of liquidity creation. Below we give our three measures of liquidity creation 
and describe in detail how we classify financial items based on liquidity. 
The functional form of measuring liquidity creation (eq. 1) remains the same throughout 
the paper while the definitions of each of the right -hand-side terms in the equation change for dif-
ferent measures. 
Liquidity Creation (LC) 
 = { ½ × illiquid assets +  0 × semi-liquid assets – ½ × liquid assets } + 
   + { ½ × liquid liabilities + 0 × semi-liquid liabilities – ½ × illiquid liabilities }       (1) 
We construct three measures of liquidity creation. The first is a gross measure meant to 
provide an overall picture of liquidity creation. The second is based on category classification of 
balance sheet items. The last is a liquidity measure based on maturity (see Appendix for detailed 
description of items used here to calculate the liquidity creation measures). 
The first liquidity creation measure (LC1), a gross indicator in line with Deep and Schaefer 
(2004), has the advantage of less strict assumptions than our other two indicators. We do not use 
detailed category or maturity classification of different balance sheet items here. The underlying 
assumption in LC1 calculation is that we account for the most important categories of assets and 
liabilities that might be classed liquid or illiquid. Total deposits are regarded as liquid liabilities and 
equity as illiquid liabilities. On the asset side, we assume total loans are illiquid assets and current 
account and securities investment are liquid assets. 
As noted, the risk of not imposing a sufficient number of assumptions in specification of 
each balance sheet item in LC1 is that we might lose our chance at creating a clear picture of how 
banks in our sample create liquidity across time or cross-sectionally if the structure within each 
                                                 
5 We do not consider off-balance sheet activities; they were not significant for most of the investigated period. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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gross term makes a difference. To capture such differences and achieve better precision, we closely 
inspect different items within broad categories in terms of their liquidity assumptions. From this, we 
construct our second measure of liquidity creation (LC2), which is based on category classification 
of balance sheet items. In defining different categories of liquid, semi-liquid, and illiquid assets and 
liabilities we follow the classification of Berger and Bouwman (2009) based on the ease, cost, and 
time necessary for banks to turn their obligations into liquid funds, and the ease, cost, and time cus-
tomers need to withdraw liquid funds from their bank. We also take country-specific issues into ac-
count.  
The liquid assets category in liquidity creation measure LC2 consists of (a) correspondent 
account with other banks (i.e. central bank, domestic, and foreign banks) (b) investments in gov-
ernment securities, and (c) investments in promissory notes. Investments in non-government securi-
ties are not included as their values were quite low for most of the observation period. The selection 
of such instruments was rather limited and Russia’s capital markets were still not liquid. Moreover, 
banks had little incentive to hold these securities as, unlike government securities, it was not possi-
ble to use them as collateral when borrowing from the CBR. 
In classification of loans, we follow the literature and classify corporate loans as illiquid 
assets as banks generally lack the option of selling them to meet their liquidity needs. The other 
categories of loans that include consumer loans, loans to government and interbank loans are classi-
fied as semi-liquid assets. Due to the fact that mortgage loans started to emerge in Russia only in 
recent years, the majority of consumer loans are short-term loans used to buy consumer goods. 
Thus, even though securitization of loans is still rare in Russia, we can classify consumer loans as 
semi-liquid by applying the rule that items with shorter maturity tend to be more liquid than longer 
term items. 
Finally, we calculate other assets by subtracting all loans and liquid assets from the total 
assets. Other assets include fixed assets, which we classify as illiquid. 
On the liability side, we distinguish between two types of claims of the non-banking sector. 
The first category includes the settlement accounts of different clients: domestic and foreign firms, 
government and households. These are classified as liquid as they can be quickly withdrawn by cus-
tomers without penalty. The same holds true for the claims of banks, so they also fall into the liquid 
liabilities category. The second category of claims of non-banking sector contains term deposits. 
Since their withdrawal is in general more difficult and costly, we consider them to be semi-liquid.  
Debt securities issued by banks include promissory notes, deposit and saving certificates, 
and bonds. Russia has liquid markets for promissory notes, the most significant of these instru- 
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ments, so we classify promissory notes as liquid liabilitie s. Deposit and saving certificates and 
bonds have gained importance only in the recent years. During our sample period, their issuance 
was not significant and the markets for these instruments were just emerging. For this reason, these 
securities are categorized as semi-liquid liabilities. 
Following the same logic as on the side of assets, we calculate other liabilities by subtract-
ing all of the above mentioned claims of banks and non-banking sector and the amount of debt se-
curities issued by a bank from total liabilities. Other liabilities such as bank capital are considered 
illiquid liabilities.  
In general, the category-based measure of liquidity creation (LC2) can be expected to be 
reasonably accurate under the assumption that the categories of assets and liabilities outlined above 
are good indicators of the liquidity of bank activities.  Based on a careful examination of the ba l-
ance sheet information of all the Russian banks in the sample, however, we find a more detailed 
breakdown reporting based on maturity for some items. Such maturity-based information provides 
us with important additional information to define the liquidity creation in a more precise manner. 
Furthermore, Berger and Bouwman (2009) conclude that maturity-based liquidity creation measures 
are better. 
We use the maturity information to construct our third liquidity creation measure (LC3). 
On the asset side, we only have available the data on maturity of interbank loans. Thus, the classifi-
cation of assets is similar to the one we employ for the second liquidity creation measure. However, 
all interbank loans are not included in the semi-liquid category anymore. Part of them, that has ma-
turity lower than one week, is considered in the category of liquid assets. Interbank loans with ma-
turity higher than one year together with nonperforming interbank loans are classified as illiquid. 
The rest of interbank loans belong to semi-liquid assets. 
Classification of liabilities for the LC3 calculation is solely based on maturity. We apply 
the general principle, whereby items that have shorter maturity are more liquid as they self-liquidate 
sooner. Term deposits and debt securities that have maturities shorter than 90 days are classified as 
liquid liabilities. We consider current and correspondent accounts to be liquid liabilities as well. Li-
abilities with maturity between 90 days and one year belong to the semi -liquid category. Finally, 
liabilities that have maturities over one year, overdue liabilities, and liabilities with uncertain terms 
to maturity are classified as illiquid. Again, similar to the category liquidity creation measure LC2, 
bank capital is treated as illiquid. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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We consider liquidity creation measures normalized to total assets to make them compara-
ble across banks and to avoid giving excessive weight to large banks.  
 
2.3  Other variables 
 
 
Explanatory variables that we use in the estimations can be divided into two groups. The first con-
tains bank-specific variables, while the second consists of variables describing local market eco-
nomic environment. The most important explanatory variable here is the capital-assets ratio (CAP), 
defined as the ratio of capital to total assets. This variable helps us uncover the relationship between 
bank capital and bank liquidity creation. 
At the bank’s level, we control for bank size and bank risk. Size is taken into account by 
using the variable logarithm of total assets. We also split the sample into three subsamples based on 
the size (large, medium, and small banks) to examine differences in the relationship of bank liquid-
ity creation and bank capital.  
We use nonperforming loans ratio, defined as the total amount of nonperforming loans di-
vided by total assets, to control for bank risk. As argued under the “risk absorption” hypothesis (e.g. 
Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, Repullo 2004, Von Thadden 2004, Coval and Thakor 2005), it is 
important to appropriately control for bank risk as the main reason for banks to hold capital is to be 
able to absorb risk. Further, Berger and Bouwman (2009) suggest that inclusion of risk measures in 
the analysis could help isolate the role of capital in the liquidity creation function from its role in 
supporting risk transformation functions of banks. We follow the standard practice in the literature 
of entering one risk measure at a time in the regressions (see e.g. Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan, 
2007).
6 
The second group of control variables takes into account the local economic environment 
of a bank. We include a Herfindahl index (HFDL) based on banking assets to control for local mar-
ket competition.  The local market is defined as the region where bank headquarters and/or branches 
are located. Given that we do not have information regarding the assets or loans or deposits assoc i-
ated with each branch of the banks, we assume that a bank’s assets are equally distributed across its 
branches (we thus treat the headquarters as a branch). We use distribution of branch offices as a 
proxy for banking output by region when calculating the Herfindahl index for a given region. The 
Herfindahl index for a bank here measures the concentration of the markets in which the bank oper-
                                                 
6 In addition to the non-performing loans ratio, we also use loan loss provisions, volatility of returns and Z-score to ac-
count for risk.  
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ates, using as weights the distribution of its branch networks in the regions. Concentration can i n-
fluence liquidity creation as it notably influences the availability of credit (Beck, Demirgüc -Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2004). We also control for other aspects of the local market by including the 
Household income growth and Small business growth in our estimations.
7 Both variables account 
for trends in the macroeconomic environment. 
 
 
3  Difference-in-difference estimations 
 
3.1  Methodology 
 
We apply the difference-in-difference approach to control for the changing economic conditions 
that might coincide with the implementation of deposit insurance. This approach enables us to ex-
ploit a unique feature of deposit insurance in Russia; i.e. even if deposit insurance was intended to 
cover all deposit-taking banks, state-controlled banks enjoyed an umbrella of implicit deposit insur-
ance throughout the whole observation period. Therefore, state-controlled banks can be considered 
as the control group in this study. To infer the effect of deposit insurance on the bank-level liquidity 
creation, we simply compare changes in liquidity creation around the time of deposit insurance in-
troduction for banks affected by the scheme (treatment group) to changes for banks unaffected by 
the scheme (control group). The difference-in-difference approach, of course, does not provide in-
formation about the change in the sign of the relationship between bank capital and liquidity crea-
tion, which is key to answering our main research question. What it does provide is information 
about the change in the magnitude of this relationship.  
The fixed effects panel-data estimators allow for heterogeneity across panel units, and pro-
duce consistent and efficient estimators as long as the unobserved time-invariant individual effects 
are not strictly orthogonal to the regressors in the regression. However, if the observed association 
between the treatment dummy variable (deposit insurance) and the dependent variable (liquidity 
creation) is driven by other incidents occurring at the time of treatment, they could lead to biased 
results. To control for this potential problem, we use a difference-in-difference approach which 
                                                 
7 Household income is defined as regional household income per capita and small enterprise business variable is calcu-
lated as number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in a given region multiplied by the average number of 
employees SMEs have in that region. Both household income growth and small business growth variables are calcu-
lated as weighted averages of regions in which a bank has its operations. We use weights based on the distribution of 
branch offices in regions. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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compares the difference between the treatment group and the control group in their changes of be-
fore and after the implementation of deposit insurance. This provides results that are robust to the 
potential bias that the observed effect of the deposit insurance implementation on liquidity creation 
was contaminated by some other concurrent or temporal policy shift. 
For a simple illustration of our methodology, consider two banks in Russia. One belongs to 
the treatment group (i.e. enrolled in the deposit insurance in 2004), and the other belongs to the con-
trol group (i.e. covered by implicit deposit insurance during the entire period). Implementation of 
the deposit insurance scheme in 2004 enables us to compare the changes in the outcomes for these 
two banks. Since both the treatment group and control group banks are chartered in Russia, they are 
affected by roughly similar economic, regulatory and political shocks, but only banks in the treat-
ment group are affected by the change in the deposit insurance implementation.  Hence, we can 
control for any economic, business, or regulatory factors that may have coincided with or led to the 
initiatives of deposit insurance scheme. 
We estimate the following model: 
t i i t i t i i t i capital treatment size capital treatment y , , , ,           
t i t i t i i z size treatment , , ,           (2) 
 
where ∆yi,t measures the changes in the bank-level liquidity creation to assets (LC/assets) after the 
deposit insurance was implemented from its level prior to the implementation. We define 2004 as 
the implementation year. The last quarter before 2004 is denoted as Q-1, and the first quarter after 
year 2004 is denoted as Q+1, and so on. Given that it might have taken some time before the banks 
adjusted their balance sheet and operating activities to the deposit insurance, we omit 2004 and the 
three quarters around 2004 in the estimation and extend the event window to eight quarters before 
and after 2004.
8 Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank was enrolled in the deposit 
insurance scheme in 2004, and 0 if the bank was state-controlled throughout our sample period. 
∆capitali,t and ∆sizei,t are defined as the changes in the capital-to-assets ratio, and the changes in 
bank size after the deposit insurance from its level before the deposit insurance was implemented, 
respectively. All control variables are defined as the changes over the same period. 
In equation (2), β captures the differences in the mean levels of increases (or decreases) of 
liquidity creation after deposit insurance from its previous level between the treatment group and 
                                                 
8 Therefore, we include Q-8, Q-7, Q-6, Q-5, Q-4, Q+4, Q+5, Q+6, Q+7, Q+8.  Our robustness tests that are based on alternative 
windows show qualitatively similar results. The results are available upon request.  
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the control group. γ measures the average differences in changes of the effects of capital ratio (δ for 
bank size) on the liquidity creation for all the banks after the deposit insurance was implemented. 
Two interaction terms are included, namely, interactions between treatment dummy vari-
able and changes in capital ratio, and treatment dummy variable and changes in bank size.   cali-
brates the mean differences in changes of the effects of capital ratio on the liquidity creation for the 
banks after the deposit insurance between the treatment group and the control group. If the estima-
tions of equation (2) yield positive   it suggests that the effects of capital ratio (bank size) on liquid-
ity creation increase more (or decrease less) after the deposit insurance was implemented, compared 
to the banks that do not receive the treatment of deposit insurance, and vice versa. Similarly,   in-
forms on the mean differences in changes of the effects of bank size. 
We are also curious whether the impact of deposit insurance treatment on the effects of the 
capital  ratio on liquidity creation depends  on bank size. To answer this,  we test  the following 
model: 
t i i t i t i i t i capital treatment size capital treatment y , , , ,
  t i t i t i t i i t i i z size capital treatment size treatment , , , , ,     (3) 
In equation (3),  η  is  the  coefficient  of  three-way  interaction  terms  between  treatment 
dummy variable, changes in capital ratio, and changes in bank size. A positive η would indicate that 
with the increase of bank size, on average, the effects of capital ratio on liquidity creation of treat-
ment group banks increased after the deposit insurance was implemented relative to the control 
group banks. 
 
3.2   Results 
 
The results of difference-in-difference estimations are presented in Table 2. Within each measure of 
liquidity creation, two models are used based on equations (2) and (3). We note that the coefficients 
on the interactions between treatment dummy and difference in capital ratio are positive in all esti-
mations, as well as significant for the LC2/assets measure. These findings provide limited evidence 
that the impact of capital ratio on liquidity creation is less negative for banks participating in the 
deposit insurance program after it was implemented relative to banks in our control group.  
Furthermore, the coefficients on the three-way interaction term between treatment dummy 
variable, difference in capital ratio, and difference in bank size are positive and significant, except Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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when LC1/assets is used. After taking out the effects of other contemporary variables on liquidity 
creation, we are left with an implication that changes in the effects of capital ratio on liquidity crea-
tion after the deposit insurance implementation are positively and linearly associated with bank size. 
Thus, we find limited evidence confirming that the impact of capital ratio on liquidity crea-
tion grows stronger with the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme. Nevertheless, the dif-
ference-in-difference approach does not uncover whether the sign of the relationship between bank 
capital and liquidity creation changes after the introduction of deposit insurance scheme. This in-




4  Separate estimations 
 
4.1  Methodology 
 
The difference-in-difference approach provides evidence on the impact of the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. We are 
however interested in the sign of this relationship and whether it changes after the introduction of 
deposit insurance. We also want to see how this sign varies with ownership and size. Indeed, key 
banking policy questions in emerging countries concern foreign bank entry and the privatization of 
banks, as well as the consolidation of the banking industry through mergers and acquisitions. There-
fore, it is reasonable to ask whether such policies influence the impact bank capital has on liquidity 
creation. 
To answer these questions, we perform regressions of the ratio of liquidity creation to as-
sets on a set of variables including the capital-assets ratio and the set of control variables. We esti-
mate separate regressions before and after the introduction of DIS in 2004, considering the periods 
from the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2003 and from the first quarter of 2005 to the 
first quarter of 2007. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we use lagged values of all explanatory variables 
to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem. Furthermore, we can reasonably consider that bank 
capital influences liquidity creation with a lag. As we have a limited number of quarters for each 
sub-period of our analysis, we consider a lag of one quarter to limit the reduction of the number of 
observations for each sub-sample. We consider alternatively three liquidity creation measures. 
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4.2  General results 
 
We present the results observed for each sample before and after the implementation of the DIS. 
Table 3 reports the results for each sub-period. The major finding is the negative coefficient of the 
bank capital variable, which is significant at the 1% level in all regressions before and after the im-
plementation of the DIS. This result suggests that in the case of Russian banks the “financial fragil-
ity/crowding out” hypothesis is stronger than the “risk absorption” hypothesis. The general implica-
tion of such a finding is that policies aimed at increasing bank capital in emerging countries may 
hamper liquidity creation. 
However, for our investigation, the main implication of this result is the fact that the im-
plementation of the DIS does not change the relationship between bank capital and liquidity crea-
tion. Indeed, as the “financial fragility/crowding out” hypothesis is more prominent in the absence 
of deposit insurance scheme, we should expect that the introduction of such scheme would diminish 
the influence of this channel. Yet we observe no such thing, indicating that the introduction of de-
posit insurance does not influence the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. All 
conclusions are very robust in the sense that they are observed with the three different liquidity 
creation measures. The results do not change if we use different variables to assess risk (loan loss 
provisions, volatility of earnings, or Z-score).
9  
We briefly turn to the analysis of control variables. We observe non -significant coeffi-
cients in the majority of cases. Similarly, Berger and Bouwman (2009) report many non-significant 
control variables in their estimations. In our case, a notable exception is the significantly positive 
coefficient for size at least for two liquidity creation measures, which suggests tha t greater banks 
may create more liquidity. Risk measures are significantly negative in several cases, suggesting that 
greater risk hampers liquidity creation. 
The difference-in-difference estimations on the impact of the implementation of the d e-
posit insurance scheme described above are thus complemented by these results. The limited effect 
of deposit insurance introduction on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation 
was not strong enough to influence the sign of this relationship, which remains negative throughout 
the observation period. 
The implications of these results are twofold. First, they suggest that by imposing capital 
requirements on banks for safety reasons regulators may hamper liquidity creation, and thereby 
                                                 
9 These results are available upon request. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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cause economic harm. In other words, a trade-off would exist between the benefits of financial sta-
bility and the costs of diminished liquidity creation. Second, the introduction of deposit insurance 
scheme does not provide a solution to this dilemma. Indeed, the relationship between bank capital 
and liquidity creation is still negative after the implementation of the DIS.  
We next ask whether our main findings might differ among size classes and types of own-
ership. Indeed, Berger and Bouwman (2009) find different relationship between bank capital and 
liquidity creation for US banks depending on the size of the bank. If the results differ with size and 
with ownership, then the role of bank capital on liquidity creation can be modified through policies 
promoting changes of size (policies favoring mergers) or privatization and foreign bank entry. We 
therefore continue our analysis with the estimations by size and by ownership. 
 
4.3  Results by size 
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation 
can vary with bank size, as hypotheses on this link are not similarly applicable for all banks. They 
claim the “risk absorption” hypothesis, which expects a positive impact of bank capital, is most ap-
plicable to large banks. This hypothesis posits that as liquidity creation enhances the likelihood of 
losses for banks, bank capital becomes more important in absorbing losses. Large banks are in this 
respect more concerned as they are more exposed to regulatory scrutiny and market discipline from 
uninsured providers of funds. They also mention that the “financial fragility/crowding out” hy-
pothesis suggests a negative relationship more applicable to small banks. Small banks tend to raise 
more funds locally than large banks. Consequently, there is larger overlap between those who invest 
in equity and those who provide deposits, resulting in greater crowding-out of deposits by equity. In 
their study on US banks, Berger and Bouwman (2009) find empirical support for these expectations, 
as the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation is significantly positive for large 
banks, significantly negative for small banks, and not significant for medium-sized banks. 
Here, we aim to check whether similar findings are applicable for an emerging country like 
Russia. Indeed, emerging markets may have different characteristics that modify the relationship 
observed on the US market. The Russian banking industry is characterized by an impressive num-
ber of banks and there are pressures to implement a consolidation process to reduce their number. 
Thus, if we find that the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation is significantly 
positive for large banks as it is the case for US banks, this would provide an additional argument to 
favor consolidation in the Russian banking industry. Indeed, it would then contribute to reduction of  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 17/ 2010 
 
 
  19 
the detrimental effects of bank capital requirements on liquidity creation. Moreover, as the introduc-
tion of the deposit insurance may have exerted a different impact  on different banks, we want to 
check whether our finding regarding the absence of impact of this introduction on the relationship 
between bank capital and liquidity creation is valid for all size categories. 
To examine the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation by size, we sepa-
rate Russian banks into three samples based on size: large banks (top 50), medium-sized banks (top 
51-200), and small banks. Tables 4 and 5 display the results for each category of banks before and 
after the introduction of the DIS, respectively. 
The results can be summarized as follows. Before the introduction of the DIS, the relation-
ship between bank capital and liquidity creation is significantly negative for small and medium 
banks and all liquidity creation measures. After the introduction of the DIS, the relationship is sig-
nificantly negative for small banks, and not significant for big banks with all liquidity creation 
measures. For medium-sized banks, the relationship is significantly negative with LC1/assets and 
LC2/assets, but not significant with LC3/assets.  
All in all, these results suggest two major conclusions. First, the comparison of size classes 
shows some differences in the link between bank capital and liquidity creation across  these sub-
groups. In other words, the relationship is significantly negative for small and medium-sized banks, 
but not significant for large banks. To some extent, these results are in line with those from Berger 
and Bouwman (2009). Similarly, we find that the “risk absorption” hypothesis according to which 
the relationship would be positive is more applicable to large banks as it offsets the negative effect 
from the “financial fragility-crowding out” hypothesis. We do not observe a significantly positive 
relationship for large banks like in the case for US banks. This finding supports a policy aiming to 
increase the size of Russian banks. Greater bank size might reduce the negative impact of bank 
capital on liquidity creation, and could consequently diminish the detrimental effects of bank capital 
requirements applied to promote financial stability. 
Second,  our  main  finding  for  all  banks  that  the  introduction  of  the  deposit  insurance 
scheme does not change the relationship of bank capital and liquidity creation is now corroborated 
in the estimations by bank size. Indeed, in most cases, the sign and significance of the coefficient 
for bank capital remains the same before and after DIS. The only exceptions are medium banks with 
LC3/assets for which the negative sign loses its significance after the DIS. Thus, even for small 
banks for which the “financial fragility/crowding out” effect plays a stronger role, the introduction Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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of the deposit insurance scheme which is expected to reduce the dominance of this effect does not 
have a significant impact. 
 
4.4   Results by ownership 
 
We now turn to estimations by ownership − a major issue in many emerging markets, including 
Russia. Three types of banks coexist in Russia: state-controlled banks, foreign-owned banks, and 
domestic private banks. This coexistence leads to major debates with notably the relevance of for-
eign bank entry and privatization. While the effects of foreign and private ownership on efficiency 
and competition in emerging markets have been widely investigated,
10 we are unaware of investiga-
tions dealing with the role ownership plays in the relationship of bank capital and liquidity creation. 
In Russia’s case, one must therefore ask whether the relationship, which is negative at the general 
level, differs by ownership format. If we find a non-negative relationship for a specific group, it 
would suggest promoting the importance of such group in the banking industry to diminish the 
negative impact of bank capital requirements. 
We  estimate  regressions  by  considering  separately  state-controlled,  foreign  and  private 
domestic banks. Results for before and after the introduction of the DIS are presented in Tables 6 
and 7. Two findings clearly emerge. First, the relationship between bank capital and liquidity crea-
tion is significantly negative for private domestic banks, whereas it is not significant for state-
controlled and foreign banks. Second, this relationship was not influenced by the introduction of the 
DIS in any group. This is in line with our former results. 
Significance of our results for different ownership groups is not surprising since banks that 
are mostly affected by deposit insurance are private domestic banks. On the other hand, state-
controlled banks have benefited from the implicit deposit insurance even before the introduction of 
the official DIS (Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2009), and foreign banks can be perceived as less sensi-
tive to bank runs owing to the presence of a foreign shareholder. Therefore, if DIS influences the 
relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation, one would particularly anticipate these 
changes for private domestic banks.  
Our first finding that the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation is not sig-
nificant for state-controlled and foreign banks could be interpreted as evidence of a cancelling out 
of both main effects even if the “financial fragility/crowding out” effect seems to dominate for pri-
                                                 
10 For Russian banks, see Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) for the role of ownership on efficiency and Fungáčová, So-
lanko and Weill (2010) for the link between ownership and competition. For a more global view of the impact of private 
ownership on performance, see Estrin et al. (2009).  
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vate domestic banks. In other words, the “risk absorption” effect plays a stronger role for foreign 
banks and state-controlled banks. In the case of foreign banks, the greater scrutiny of foreign share-
holders might ascribe a higher importance of bank capital in absorbing potential losses associated 
with greater liquidity creation. This finding suggests that authorities should consider promoting for-
eign bank entry or preserving state ownership if they wish to limit the detrimental effects of the 
bank capital requirements on liquidity creation. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
This paper examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects the relationship between 
bank capital and liquidity creation. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), this issue appears to 
have value in addressing the normative implications of bank capital requirements. Indeed, financial 
authorities today encourage banks to increase their bank capital in the name of financial stability, 
while neglecting the role of banks in liquidity creation (which, as the relevant literature suggests, 
can be influenced by bank capital). 
Introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in Russia in 2004 serves as a natural experi-
ment that permits testing the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. It also allows 
investigating this relationship in the context of a major emerging economy. 
We find limited evidence that the post-insurance impact of bank capital on liquidity crea-
tion is less negative. Nonetheless, the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme did not change the 
sign of this impact, which is negative both before and after implementation. This negative relation-
ship between bank capital and liquidity creation has important policy implications as it suggests that 
bank capital requirements implemented for safety reasons may actually harm liquidity creation, and 
thereby harm performance of the economy. There appears to be a trade-off between the benefits of 
financial stability and the costs of lower liquidity creation for greater bank capital. 
Additional estimations confirm that relationship between bank capital and liquidity crea-
tion varies with size and type of ownership. This relationship is not significant for large banks, for-
eign banks, and state-controlled banks, but is significantly negative for small and medium-sized 
banks, as well as for private domestic banks. These findings point to a number of ways policymak-
ers might mitigate the detrimental effects of greater bank capital for liquidity creation. Most nota-
bly, policies that promote consolidation of Russian banks to boost their size and the opening up of Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill, Mingming Zhou   Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance 
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the banking sector to foreign banks appear to have diminished the negative impacts of bank capital 
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of liquidity creation measures (LC1, LC2, and LC3) 
 
The following are definitions of the balance sheet items in terms of their liquidity, which is the basis 
for calculation of the liquidity creation measures. The general functional form to calculate liquidity 
creation is given by Equation (1) and the weights of different items are reported in the parentheses. 
LC1 is a gross measure of liquidity creation, based on the rough liquidity characteristics of broad 
categories of financial terms. In constructing the second liquidity creation measure (LC2), we clas-
sify the bank activities based on the categories. LC3 is based on the category as well as the maturity 




















  Illiquid assets (1/2)  Liquid assets (-1/2) 
Total loans   Correspondent accounts with other banks 
  Securities investments 
Liquid liabilities (1/2)  Illiquid liabilities (-1/2) 























Illiquid assets (1/2)  Semi-liquid assets (0)  Liquid assets (-1/2) 
Loans to firms  Interbank loans  Correspondent accounts with other 
banks 
Other assets   Loans to government  Government securities (incl. securities 
issued by regions and municipalities) 
  Loans to individuals  Investments to promissory notes 
Liquid liabilities (1/2)  Semi-liquid liabilities (0)  Illiquid liabilities (-1/2) 
Debt securities issued (prom-
issory notes) 
Debt securities issued (depo-
sit and saving certificates, 
bonds) 
Other liabilities 
Claims of non-bank sector : 
settlement accounts (firms, 
households, government) 
Claims of non-bank sector : 



























Illiquid assets (1/2)  Semi-liquid assets (0)  Liquid assets (-1/2) 
Interbank loans (maturity 
more than 1 year, nonper-
forming interbank loans) 
Interbank loans (maturity 
more than a week and less 
than 1 year) 
Interbank loans (maturity less than a 
week) 
Loans to firms  Loans to government  Correspondent accounts with other 
banks 
Other assets  Loans to individuals  Government securities (incl. securities 
issued by regions and municipalities) 
    Investments into prom. notes 
Liquid liabilities (1/2)  Semi-liquid liabilities (0)  Illiquid liabilities (-1/2) 
Liabilities with maturity low-
er than 90 days 
Liabilities (term deposits and 
debt securities) with maturity 
less than 1 year 
Liabilities (term deposits,  debt securi-
ties) with maturity more than 1 year and 
overdue liabilities and liabilities with 
uncertain term to maturity 
Current and corresponding 
accounts 
  Capital 
 
 Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables for the period before the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme (DIS) from 2001 to 2003 and after its introduction from 2005 to 2007. 
 
 
  Before DIS  After DIS 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
deviation  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
deviation 
LC1 (in proportion of assets)  10542  0.32  0.20  7541  0.47  0.19 
LC2 (in proportion of assets)  10542  0.27  0.18  7541  0.30  0.16 
LC3 (in proportion of assets)  10542  0.22  0.18  7541  0.20  0.16 
Size (ln of assets)  10542  5.86  1.83  7541  7.10  1.80 
Nonperf. loans ratio  10542  0.01  0.02  7541  0.01  0.02 
Capital-asset ratio  10542  0.29  0.18  7541  0.21  0.15 
Herfindahl index  10542  0.18  0.17  7541  0.14  0.12 
Household income growth  10542  33.27  11.39  7541  22.39  10.23 
Small business growth  10542  0.07  0.46  7541  0.18  0.83 
 
 




This table presents the results based on the difference-in-difference approach. Dependent variables are the three liquidity creation (LC1, LC2, and LC3 
normalized by total assets), respectively. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bank was enrolled in the deposit insurance scheme around 
2004, and 0 otherwise (i.e. state-controlled banks). All variables are defined as the changes between corresponding quarters before and after 2004, a year in 
which deposit insurance was implemented. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 
at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
Liquidity creation measure  
(% of assets)    
LC1 (difference)  LC2 (difference)  LC3 (difference) 




**  -0.067  -0.068 
  [7.91]  [7.90]  [2.11]  [2.12]  [1.22]  [1.24] 







  [5.23]  [5.29]  [2.68]  [2.59]  [1.91]  [1.81] 




***  -0.433  -0.435
* 
  [6.65]  [6.64]  [4.02]  [4.03]  [1.64]  [1.65] 







  [3.01]  [2.99]  [2.77]  [2.79]  [2.45]  [2.48] 
Treatment × capital assets ratio 
(difference) 
  0.036  0.002  0.829
**  0.894
***  0.008  0.105 
  [0.36]  [0.02]  [2.58]  [2.77]  [0.03]  [0.39] 







  [4.84]  [4.95]  [3.00]  [2.89]  [2.02]  [1.84] 
Treatment × capital assets ratio 
difference × size (difference) 
    -0.022    0.042
**    0.063
*** 
    [1.12]    [2.47]    [2.93] 
Nonperf. loans (difference)    0.394  0.400  -0.082  -0.094  -0.556
*  -0.574
** 
  [1.39]  [1.42]  [0.30]  [0.35]  [1.94]  [2.02] 







  [2.40]  [2.32]  [2.63]  [2.51]  [5.05]  [4.89] 





  [0.26]  [0.33]  [2.30]  [2.18]  [3.24]  [3.10] 
Small business growth (difference)    -0.002  -0.002  -0.006  -0.005  -0.011
*  -0.010
* 
  [0.72]  [0.80]  [1.12]  [1.04]  [1.92]  [1.83] 
Observations     19011  19011  19011  19011  19011  19011 
F-statistics    73.87  67.77  42.55  43.74  27.13  28.00 
R-squared     0.34  0.34  0.22  0.22  0.13  0.14 Table 3 
 
Main estimations for the period before and after introduction of deposit insurance scheme (DIS) 
 
Fixed effect estimations for the period before the deposit insurance scheme was implemented (2001−2003) and 
after its implementation (2005–2007). Dependent variables are liquidity creation measures as indicated in the 
second row. Explanatory variables are one period lagged. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered by banks. T-statistics are reported in brackets below estimated coefficients.  *,  **,  *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. Dummy variables for quarters 
and years are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
    Before DIS     After DIS 
Liquidity measure (% of 





**  0.087  0.142 
[5.40]  [5.20]  [6.51]  [2.57]  [0.98]  [1.53] 







[11.68]  [11.47]  [11.44]  [8.42]  [5.36]  [4.77] 
Size  0.023
***  0.021
***  0.005  0.044
***  0.035
***  0.009 
[3.18]  [3.49]  [0.79]  [4.30]  [2.97]  [0.71] 
Nonperforming loans  -0.549
***  -0.285  -0.351
*  -0.102  -0.091  -0.223 
[2.92]  [1.56]  [1.70]  [0.45]  [0.38]  [0.84] 
Herfindahl index  0.045  0.117
**  0.049  0.097  0.172
**  0.319
*** 
[0.77]  [2.35]  [0.95]  [1.15]  [2.26]  [3.49] 
Household income growth   -0.001
*  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001   -0.001
*** 
[1.84]  [0.40]  [0.92]  [1.08]  [0.96]  [3.60] 
Small business growth  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.002 
[0.58]  [1.17]  [1.54]  [0.33]  [0.41]  [0.68] 
Observations  10324  10324  10324  7323  7323  7323 
No. of banks  916  916  916  916  916  916 




 Table 4 
 
Estimations for different size groups before introduction of deposit insurance scheme 
 
 
Fixed effect estimations for the period before the deposit insurance scheme was implemented (2001−2003). Dependent 
variables are liquidity creation measures as indicated in the second row. Explanatory variables are one period lagged. 
Regressions  are  estimated  with  robust  standard  errors  clustered  by  banks.  T-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets  below 
estimated  coefficients.  *,  **,  ***  denote  an  estimate  significantly  different  from  0  at  the  10%,  5%,  or  1%  level, 
respectively. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 









**  0.159  0.22  0.530
*  0.388  0.279 









***  -0.239  -0.055  -0.169 
[11.02]  [11.08]  [10.93]  [1.77]  [2.13]  [2.74]  [1.51]  [0.35]  [0.90] 
Size  0.025
***  0.021
***  0.005  0.004  0.022  0.004  -0.019  -0.013  -0.005 






*  -0.209  0.508  0.223  -1.331
*  -0.038  0.202 




**  0.031  -0.055  0.047  0.191  0.843
**  0.422  0.285 





*  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001 




-0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.008  0.001  -0.005  0.005  -0.018  -0.034 
[0.46]  [1.10]  [1.36]  [0.43]  [0.03]  [0.33]  [0.18]  [0.73]  [0.93] 
Observations  8483  8483  8483  1337  1337  1337  504  504  504 
No. of banks  792  792  792  175  175  175  56  56  56 






 Table 5 
 
Estimations for different size groups after introduction of deposit insurance scheme 
 
 
Fixed effect estimations for the period after the deposit insurance  scheme was implemented (2005−2007). Dependent 
variables are liquidity creation measures as indicated in the second row. Explanatory variables are one period lagged. 
Regressions  are  estimated  with  robust  standard  errors  clustered  by  banks.  T-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets  below 
estimated  coefficients.  *,  **,  ***  denote  an  estimate  significantly  different  from  0  at  the  10%,  5%,  or  1%  level, 
respectively. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 




LC1  LC2  LC3  LC1  LC2  LC3  LC1  LC2  LC3 
Constant  0.172
**  0.057  0.098  0.705
***  0.505
**  0.485  0.369  0.380  0.564 








**  -0.125  -0.186  0.074  0.181 
[7.57]  [4.80]  [4.52]  [2.11]  [2.11]  [1.01]  [1.02]  [0.52]  [1.27] 
Size  0.050
***  0.040
***  0.017  -0.016  -0.014  -0.032  0.025  -0.001  -0.040 
[4.27]  [3.08]  [1.21]  [0.76]  [0.54]  [0.85]  [1.06]  [0.06]  [1.10] 
Nonperform. 
loans 
0.053  0.120  0.028  -0.737  -0.936  -1.600
**  -0.562  -2.436
**  -0.586 





***  0.016  0.203  0.320
**  -0.231  0.384  0.266 




0.001  0.001  -0.001
***  0.001
**  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 




-0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.039
*  -0.008  0.018  -0.008  -0.034  -0.027 
[0.35]  [0.34]  [0.55]  [1.81]  [0.38]  [0.65]  [0.19]  [0.79]  [0.41] 
Observations  5734  5734  5734  1159  1159  1159  430  430  430 
No. of banks  760  760  760  180  180  180  58  58  58 







 Table 6 
 
Estimations for different ownership groups before introduction of deposit insurance scheme 
 
 
Fixed effect estimations for the period before the deposit insurance scheme was implemented (2001−2003). Dependent 
variables are liquidity creation measures as indicated in the second row. Explanatory variables are one period lagged. 
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by banks. T-statistics are reported in brackets below 
estimated coefficients.  *,  **,  *** denote an estimate significantly different  from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, 
respectively. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
 








***  -0.004  0.076  0.287  -0.506  0.080  0.701 






***  -0.290  -0.304  -0.501
**  -0.001  -0.12  -0.077 
[11.35]  [10.93]  [10.92]  [1.27]  [1.44]  [2.35]  [0.00]  [0.77]  [0.25] 
Size  0.024
***  0.024
***  0.008  0.043  0.032  0.007  0.113  0.018  -0.077 






**  2.037  2.362  1.702  1.043  1.942
***  1.997
** 




**  0.037  0.166  0.081  0.139  0.049  0.134  0.425 




0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001 




-0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.008  -0.018  -0.024  0.030  -0.051 
[0.71]  [1.24]  [1.55]  [0.05]  [0.20]  [0.56]  [0.30]  [0.68]  [0.95] 
Observations  9817  9817  9817  231  231  231  276  276  276 
No. of banks  871  871  871  20  20  20  33  33  33 
R-squared  0.37  0.26  0.21  0.07  0.01  0.04  0.19  0.18  0.06 
 
 
 Table 7 
 
Estimations for different ownership groups after introduction of deposit insurance scheme 
Fixed effect estimations for the period after the deposit insurance scheme was implemented (2005−2007). Dependent 
variables are liquidity creation measures as indicated in the second row. Explanatory variables are one period lagged. 
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by banks. T-statistics are reported in brackets below 
estimated  coefficients.  *,  **,  ***  denote  an  estimate  significantly  different  from  0  at  the  10%,  5%,  or  1%  level, 
respectively. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
Sample  Private domestic banks  State-controlled banks  Foreign-owned banks 
Liquidity 
measure  
(% of assets) 
LC1  LC2  LC3  LC1  LC2  LC3  LC1  LC2  LC3 
Constant  0.252
***  0.128  0.132  0.214  0.173  1.190
***  -0.198  -0.299  0.292 






***  -0.251  0.171  0.128  -0.103  -0.139  -0.095 
[9.74]  [6.05]  [4.73]  [0.66]  [0.65]  [0.32]  [0.65]  [0.68]  [0.68] 
Size  0.038
***  0.030
***  0.010  0.036  0.010  -0.098
**  0.085  0.074  -0.012 
[4.37]  [2.82]  [0.81]  [0.75]  [0.24]  [2.71]  [1.57]  [1.42]  [0.24] 
Nonperf. 
loans 
-0.143  -0.213  -0.172  1.113  0.800  -0.988  0.880  1.468  -0.710 





***  -0.036  0.109  -0.258  0.235  0.061  -0.817 




0.001  0.001  -0.001
***  0.001
*  0.001
**  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 




-0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.060  -0.090  -0.130
*  -0.170
*  -0.160  -0.144
** 
[0.27]  [0.48]  [0.71]  [1.04]  [1.67]  [1.91]  [1.75]  [1.55]  [2.19] 
Observations  6849  6849  6849  173  173  173  301  301  301 
No. of banks  866  866  866  20  20  20  49  49  49 
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